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MAKING THE PEG FIT THE HOLE: A SUPERIOR SOLUTION TO THE 
INHERENT PROBLEMS OF INCORPORATED DEFINITIONS 
Lindsey P. Gustafson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For more than a century, scholars have warned legislative drafters that 
defining terms with borrowed language, created through an incorporated 
reference rather than through carefully tailored language, is risky. Scholars 
have used strong words in their warnings: incorporated definitions are la-
beled “traps for the unwary”1 that create “a statutory jungle”;2 scholars ques-
tion whether they are worthwhile3 or whether they allow drafters to “borrow 
now and pay later”;4 and the statutory construction used to interpret is char-
acterized as a “loose cannon.”5 Despite the warnings, incorporated refer-
ences have become ubiquitous in federal and most state systems,6 and are a 
significant contributor to the complexity of the statutory systems we all must 
unwind and apply has increased. 
 
        * Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen 
School of Law. The article was written with the generous support of a writing grant from the 
Bowen School of Law and with the invaluable research aid of Stephan McBride and Bill 
Godbold. Special thanks to my brother, Adam Pierson, for bringing this issue to my attention 
and convincing me it mattered. 
 1. See Scott A. Baxter, Reference Statutes: Traps for the Unwary, 30 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 562, 563–64 (1999) (comparing incorporated references to nesting dolls). 
 2. See Arie Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference—A Statutory Jungle, 38 IOWA L. 
REV. 705 (1953). 
 3. See Horace Emerson Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While?, 25 MINN. L. 
REV. 261 (1941). 
 4. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., “Reference Statutes”—Borrow Now and Pay Later?, 10 
GA. L. REV. 153 (1975). 
 5. See Ernest E. Means, Statutory Cross References—The “Loose Cannon” of Statuto-
ry Construction in Florida, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
 6. Some states constitutionally prohibited incorporations by reference. See REED 
DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 132–33 (1986) (listing New Jersey, 
New York, Louisiana). These provisions are narrowly interpreted because a literal reading of 
the ban would “lead to innumerable repetitions of laws in the statute books, and render them 
not only bulky and cumbersome but confused and unintelligible, almost beyond conception.” 
Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 541 N.Y.S.2d 829, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). Scholars have com-
plained that these prohibitions themselves are routinely manipulated by the courts. Baxter, 
supra note 1, at 570 (“Judicial neglect of these statutory mandates is troubling because such 
neglect undermines the certainty reference statute construction laws are supposed to instill in 
the codes. Researchers are left in the same position as under the common law rules, wonder-
ing (or oblivious to) which law is applicable.”). 
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For a modern example of the statutory uncertainty created by incorpo-
rated references, consider Jose Angel Carachuri–Rosendo, a lawful perma-
nent resident of the United States since he was five years old, who in 2006 
received notice that he faced deportation under federal law.7 Mr. Carachuri-
Rosendo had been convicted in Texas state court of two misdemeanors. The 
first conviction was for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana, for 
which he received twenty days in jail.8 The second conviction was for pos-
session of a single antianxiety tablet without a prescription, for which he 
received ten days.9 Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo conceded that his misdemeanor 
convictions made him eligible for removal, but he sought discretionary relief 
from removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) because he met all of the section’s qualifiers, including not being 
convicted of an “aggravated felony.”10 
But the INA does not provide an independent definition of aggravated 
felony; it instead adopts through reference a definition from the federal 
criminal code,11 which in turn adopts through reference a definition from the 
Controlled Substances Act.12 These layers of cross-referencing led to three 
separate circuit splits, including one resolved by Mr. Carachuri-Rosendo’s 
petition for relief, and led the Supreme Court to complain that—to deter-
mine the meaning of “aggravated felony” as used in section 1229b(a)—it 
was forced to navigate a “maze of statutory cross-references.”13 
While borrowing a definition from another portion of the federal code 
appears to promote efficiency and harmony between statutory sections and 
promise a tested and reliable definition, doing so via an incorporated refer-
ence may raise two significant issues: what language is actually adopted and 
how to interpret the meaning of the definition in its new context. 
The first problem occurs when the original definition has been amend-
ed, renumbered, or eliminated, so courts must determine whether the incor-
porated reference is likewise altered because it was created through a dy-
namic link or whether the incorporated reference adopts only the language 
in place at the time of the incorporation because it was created through a 
static link. Determining the language of a statutory definition is Congress’s 
constitutional prerogative, yet, if lawmakers fail to clearly indicate how an 
incorporated definition is impacted by a change to the original definition, 
 
 7. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2014) (incorporating by reference 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
(2006)). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (defining “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable 
under the Controlled Substances Act”). 
 13. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 567. 
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the historic interpretive canons and their inconsistent application provide 
courts with seemingly unlimited justification in setting the language of the 
definition. 
Second, with all incorporated references, courts are tasked with deter-
mining the meaning of definitions, and too often the sloppy fit of the incor-
porated definition in its new home results in uncertain and unpredictable 
applications. Drafters who do not have to craft a definition are less likely to 
be careful with the language of the definition.14 And those governed by these 
definitions—especially those without sophisticated representation—are vul-
nerable to their unexpected and apparently undeliberated scope. 
Further, the interpretive canons also fail to create predictable interpre-
tations of terms. Consequently, some courts borrow the meaning of the lan-
guage in its original context to inform the meaning in the new context, and 
other courts do not. Litigants are left wondering not only which language 
may define a key term, but whether a court will limit the borrowing to the 
language of the original definition or expand it to include the language and 
the meaning it has developed in its original context.15 
Both problems erode the shared mental space between the lawmakers, 
the courts, and the public that an effective definition must have.16 This arti-
cle revisits the disconnections created when incorporated references are used 
to define terms in the federal system and offers a solution in two parts: one 
for drafters and one for interpreting courts. Part II begins by justifying the 
article’s focus on definitions and by describing how the most effective, pre-
dictable definitions evolve from a shared understanding between lawmakers 
and interpreting courts. Part III gives two extended modern examples of the 
confusion created by incorporated references when there is no apparent 
shared understanding. And Part IV provides the two-part solution: First, 
lawmakers must retake their roles in announcing whether incorporated ref-
 
 14. DICKERSON, supra note 6, at 130 (“That incorporated language is less likely to be 
checked by the draftsman . . . increases the chances of mistake or deception.”). 
 15. Two specific problems of incorporation by reference have been raised in recent 
articles but are not covered here. One is the lack of public access when the adopted material 
is not available to the public. See Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-
Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 133–36 (2013) (noting that the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) contains over 9,500 incorporated references, many of them to 
private documents that require payment to view, and that this inaccessibility is a particularly 
acute problem for transparency during rulemaking). The second consists of the unique prob-
lems raised by incorporated references in international treaties. See John F. Coyle, Incorpora-
tive Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 664–69 (2010) (noting the 
risk that courts called upon to interpret an incorporative statute will “pay too little attention to 
its international origins, disregard important international and foreign law sources, or read the 
statute through an exclusively domestic lens”). 
 16. See Jeanne Frazier Price, Wagging, Not Barking: Statutory Definitions, 60 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 999, 1033 (2013). 
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erences are static or dynamic, removing from the courts the burden of de-
termining the language of a definition through the alternatively formulaic or 
manipulated reliance on a characterization of a reference as either general or 
specific; and second, courts should determine the meaning of incorporated 
language using an approach that is consistent with the established spectrum 
of shared language. 
In short, legislative drafters should be just as precise and careful with 
selecting incorporated language as they are with crafting original language. 
Although incorporated references are relied upon as an efficient, essential 
tool, using them effectively so as not to facilitate thoughtless drafting may 
require even more drafting time than it saves.17 
II. THE SHARED MENTAL SPACE OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFINITION 
A. Definitions and Discretion 
Definitions are the gatekeepers of statutory law and the focal point of 
statutory interpretation. Not all statutory terms need definition,18 but when 
drafters undertake to set the limits on a term’s meaning, the limits should be 
precisely and clearly communicated so that the public knows how to con-
form its behavior, and those who enforce and interpret the law have clear 
boundaries “outside of which interpretation ought not to stray.”19 Carefully 
crafted definitions “narrow the margin of uncertainty in application, and 
reduce the number of hard cases.”20 They establish an objective system of 
adjudication, one that “govern[s] by rules that meaningfully limit discre-
tion.”21 
 
 17. See DICKERSON, supra note 6, at 131 (“[T]ime legitimately saved by incorporation is 
less than first appears, because it takes time to screen even compatible incorporated materi-
al.”). 
 18. See id. at 137–38 (advising the drafters of definitions to limit meaning “only when 
necessary” and “only as full as necessary” because it is “apparently easier to use words 
properly than to define them accurately”). 
 19. Price, supra note 16, at 1019–20 (“To define is to limit . . . .”). Although imprecise 
definitions may create considerable confusion and inconsistent governance, they are not void 
for vagueness so long as they “give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his con-
templated conduct is forbidden by the statute” and discourage “arbitrary and erratic arrests 
and convictions.” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979) (describing the constitution-
al flaw of “void for vagueness”). 
 20. Price, supra note 16, at 1022. 
 21. Gerald Leonard, Rape, Murder, and Formalism: What Happens If We Define Mis-
take of Law?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 511 n.12 (2001); see also Price, supra note 16, at 
1033 (noting that definitions may “establish a shared mental space, in which lawmakers and 
those subject to laws are consistently informed of the ground rules for interpretation . . . and 
meaning to the world at large”). 
2015] PROBLEMS WITH INCORPORATED DEFINITIONS 367 
Effective definitions limit, but do not eliminate, an interpreting court’s 
discretion because flexibility allows statutes to meet the dynamic move-
ments of technology, the market, and society generally. Definitions should 
be “crisp” yet “flexible.”22 Drafters must not only be precise in defining 
terms, but also thoughtful in crafting language that gives courts space and 
discretion to apply the definitions sensibly and fairly, in a way that is “re-
flective of the appropriate theoretical underpinnings.”23 In return, courts 
articulate and regularly apply rules and canons to interpret the language, so 
“lawmakers and those subject to laws are consistently informed of the 
ground rules for interpretation and application.”24 The aim is to create “a 
shared mental space” between those creating the law, those applying the 
law, and those conforming their behavior to those laws.25 
Unfortunately, when drafters use a shortcut to create the definition ra-
ther than tailor language to its purpose, too often the drafters and legislators 
fail to consider and debate the meaning of the incorporated language. The 
rough fit of the definition to its new context forces courts to interpret the 
definition, but the courts’ interpretative rules may fail in turn to inform the 
lawmakers because the rules are manipulated and inconsistently applied.26 
And litigants may not appreciate from the plain language of the statute that 
there is ambiguity in the scope of the incorporated definition. 
B. The Appeal of Incorporated Definitions 
Statutory drafters do not work on a blank slate; they create meaning to 
fit within an already complex network of legislation. Since the beginning of 
American legislative history, drafters have mined existing statutes for defi-
 
 22. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATIONS 3 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2010). 
 23. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Evaluating Mistakes in Intellectual Property Law: Configur-
ing the System to Account for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167, 170–71 
(2000) (noting drafters should not “enshrine static definitions of statutory subject matter and 
the corresponding rights”); see also Price, supra note 16, at 1022; DEBORAH CAO, 
TRANSLATING LAW 122 (2007) (“[L]egislative language must anticipate a world that does not 
exist at the time of expression and must be prepared for an infinity of possibilities.”). 
 24. Price, supra note 16, at 1033; see also Coyle, supra note 15, at 697 (stating the goal 
of statutory interpretation is that “a system of established rules of construction might make 
the process of statutory interpretation more predictable, effective, and even legitimate”) 
(quoting John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 284 
(2002)). 
 25. Price, supra note 16, at 1033. 
 26. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” 
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1898 (2011) (noting judges’ failure to settle on a 
consistent and predictable approach to statutory interpretation); Coyle, supra note 15, at 698 
(noting that rules “invite judges openly to take policy considerations into account when de-
ciding what a statute means”). 
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nitions that may be incorporated and repurposed.27 Definitions may be bor-
rowed through two methods: First, drafters may simply repeat a definition in 
its new context, with or without a reference to the original section. Courts 
are more likely to view this borrowing as creating a distinct definition, but 
there is a risk that repeating long, complicated definitions will create unin-
tended differences, or that courts and litigants will fail to see and consider 
the links between the two definitions.28 Second, drafters may borrow a defi-
nition through an incorporated reference. This method is a recognized, legit-
imate, and necessary drafting tool, allowing drafters to efficiently borrow a 
definition and possibly further the harmony of statutory sections.29 
Drafters use incorporated definitions as a shortcut, but they may also 
rely on an existing definition because it (apparently, but not assuredly) rep-
resents a tested, accepted meaning. When elements of proposed legislation 
are likely to be contentious, lawmakers may borrow an established defini-
tion not only to avoid re-drafting something that appears to be working, but 
also to move at least a portion of the legislation out of debate.30 
Incorporated references are not only efficient; they may act to further 
the harmony of federal legislation. The principle of harmony, which has 
become increasingly important with the complexity of legislation,31 encour-
ages courts to find the meaning of terms by referring to the meaning of the 
same term in other statutory sections.32 It is therefore not only unrealistic, 
but undesirable for drafters to create every definition whole cloth. 
The ease of the drafting shortcut, however, often leads to definitions 
that are not carefully deliberated. The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 
decision that required it to interpret definitions incorporated by the Secretary 
of Labor from the Americans with Disabilities Act and placed in the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), complained that the drafting Secretary 
 
 27. See F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 
LA. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2008); DICKERSON, supra note 6, at 130 (“Incorporation by reference 
saves space and sometimes valuable time for the draftsman (if not for the users).”). 
 28. DICKERSON, supra note 6, at 130. 
 29. See Boyd, supra note 27, at 1202; DICKERSON, supra note 6, at 130 (claiming that 
“[w]here parallel results are desirable, [incorporated references] guarantee[] them,” which, as 
discussed infra, overstates the case). 
 30. Credit for this idea goes to the faculty of the St. Mary’s University School of Law, 
who shared with me their experience drafting legislation and using incorporated reference for 
just this purpose. The irony, of course, is that definitions that mean one thing and are effec-
tive in one area of legislation may not mean the same thing or even work in another area. The 
incorporated definitions should be fully debated, not slipped in. 
 31. 2B NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
53:1 (7th ed. 2014) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND] (“[L]egislation never is written on a clean 
slate, never is read in isolation, and never applies in a vacuum.”). 
 32. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994) (affirm-
ing “the familiar principle of statutory construction that, when possible, courts should con-
strue statutes . . . to foster harmony with other statutory and constitutional law”). 
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“caught the nearest way” when “in lieu of tailoring the definition of terms . . 
. to suit the peculiar needs of the FMLA, the Secretary simply co-opted ex-
isting definitions.”33 When drafters and lawmakers fail to thoughtfully con-
sider the nuances of a definition, the hard work of making the definition fit 
is pushed to the courts, which are ill-equipped by interpretative canons to 
resolve the issues in predictable, consistent ways.34 
III. THE CONFUSION CAUSED BY INCORPORATED DEFINITIONS IN 
MODERN FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
An incorporated definition can be the square peg in a round hole: draft-
ers are taking a definition created for one purpose and using it for another.35 
Sometimes the purposes of both statutes are so similar that the use of a 
linked definition is preferable to the creation of a unique definition, but oth-
er times the link reveals (as the Navarro court suspected) sloppy legislation 
that repurposes a definition whose meaning, in turn, does not enjoy a shared 
mental space.36 
The following examples illustrate how modern layers of complex statu-
tory schemes exacerbate the weaknesses and uncertainties of incorporated 
references. Definitions are often linked across unrelated legislation; drafters 
may not fully investigate the meaning of the incorporated definition or antic-
ipate its fit in a new context—the words themselves are not even part of the 
proposed legislation—and the lawmakers may not understand the definition 
they have just adopted. 
To interpret and apply the statutes, a court may stretch the meaning of 
an incorporated definition in an unpredictable way to fit a new purpose, or a 
court’s application of a term in a new context may reveal previously unap-
preciated weaknesses in the definition. 
 
 33. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 92–93, 96–97 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 34. Despite this shift, courts have uniformly held the use of incorporated references 
constitutional; “[e]ven if such incorporation by reference were somehow regarded as a ‘dele-
gation’ of power, it would not pose any problem, because the delegated power is exercised 
only by the full Congress acting through the constitutionally prescribed procedures for enact-
ing another statute.” Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Sepa-
rated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1481 (2000). 
 35. See DICKERSON, supra note 6, at 130 (warning that the “big” risk of incorporated 
references is “that the incorporated reference may not adequately fit the immediate situa-
tion”). 
 36. Any kind of borrowed definition—including the modeling of language—can be 
sloppy, but the problems described here are more often present in incorporated references, 
presumably because the lawmakers do not have the language of the borrowed definition 
included as part of the legislation. 
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A. A Cascade of Circuit Splits Caused by Layers of Ill-Fitting Definitions 
in the INA, the Federal Criminal Code, and the Sentencing Guidelines 
The “maze of statutory cross references” interpreted by the Supreme 
Court in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder37 is an extreme example of the con-
fusion caused by incorporated definitions that span titles in the federal code 
and in the Sentencing Guidelines. The Court’s holding in Carachuri-
Rosendo resolved just one of the three circuit splits generated by four layers 
of incorporated references. The courts—and the impacted defendants—were 
confused not only by the sloppy cross-section references from the INA to 
the federal criminal code to the Sentencing Guidelines, but also by the layers 
of interpretation courts built on this poor link. 
1. Circuit Split #1: Whether Conduct Not Punishable Under the 
Controlled Substances Act Could Be Considered a Felony Pun-
ishable Under the Controlled Substances Act 
Section 1229b(a)(3) of the INA makes an alien ineligible for cancella-
tion of removal proceedings if he or she has been convicted of an “aggravat-
ed felony.”38 The definitions section of the INA defines “aggravated felony” 
with an incorporated reference to the federal criminal code: An aggravated 
felony includes “a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of 
Title 18).” Section 924(c)(2) defines a “drug trafficking crime” as “any fel-
ony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.”39 
In Lopez v. Gonzales, the Court was asked to decide whether Jose An-
tonio Lopez—who had been convicted in South Dakota of a felony drug 
offense—was eligible for cancellation of removal because the state felony 
conviction was not for conduct punishable under the Controlled Substances 
Act.40 In essence, the Court had to decide whether a crime not punishable 
under the Controlled Substances Act could be a felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act,41 and thereby a drug trafficking crime,42 and 
thereby an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA,43 and thereby an of-
fense that made Lopez ineligible for cancellation of removal.44 
The lower courts had been split on this issue, with the Eighth Circuit 
holding in Lopez that section 924(c)(2) required only that an offense be pun-
 
 37. 560 U.S. 563 (2010). 
 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2008). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2006). 
 40. 549 U.S. 47, 50–51 (2006). 
 41. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801889 (1970). 
 42. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). 
 43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2014). 
 44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2008). 
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ishable, not that it be punishable as a felony.45 The Supreme Court, however, 
held that the words meant exactly what they appear to mean: that the activity 
must be punishable under the Controlled Substances Act to fall within the 
definition in section 924(c)(2) and to exclude Lopez from cancellation of 
removal.46 
2. Circuit Split #2: Whether a Conviction in State Court for Conduct 
That May Have Been Punishable as a Felony Under the Con-
trolled Substances Act Could Be Considered a Conviction for an 
Aggravated Felony Under the Controlled Substances Act 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez, courts continued to 
struggle with the scope of an INA definition pulled from the federal criminal 
code. Lower courts developed the “hypothetical felony approach” to apply 
the Lopez holding. Under this approach, courts “g[o] beyond the state stat-
ute’s elements to look at the hypothetical conduct a state statute pro-
scribes.”47 If conduct could “hypothetically” have been punished as a felony 
had it been prosecuted in a federal court, it is an “aggravated felony” for 
federal immigration law purposes.48 This approach was criticized as pulling 
the meaning of the phrase “any felony punishable under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act” too far from the statutory text and presenting a difference in 
meaning that could unexpectedly and drastically impact immigrants.49 
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, the government argued that 
Carachuri-Rosendo’s second misdemeanor conviction in a Texas state court 
could hypothetically have been prosecuted as a felony in federal court.50 As 
a consequence, Carachuri-Rosendo was ineligible for cancellation of remov-
al.51 To have understood the federal government’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 
 
 45. Lopez v. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 46. Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47, 50 (2006). 
 47. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d 263, 266 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 560 
U.S. 563 (2010). 
 48. See Fernandez v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 862, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2008). But the First, 
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have adopted the approach the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals advocated in its en banc opinion in Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382 (B.I.A. 
2007). See Berhe v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2006); Alsol v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 207 
(2d Cir. 2008); Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding specifically on the 
meaning in the INS context, but holding open the meaning in the Guidelines, recognizing that 
the two statutory systems have different purposes, and therefore the terms may have different 
meanings). 
 49. See Allison M. Whitmore, The Need to Know: Why Multiple State Drug Possession 
Offenses Should Not Automatically Amount to an Aggravated Felony, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 359, 359–60 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2006 
)). 
 50. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 570. 
 51. Id. at 572–73. 
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§ 1229b(a)(3), and to thereby have anticipated the behavior that would make 
him ineligible for cancellation of removal, Carachuri-Rosendo would have 
had to understand these steps in the statutory maze: (1) the cancellation of 
removal statute, § 1229b(a)(3), makes an alien ineligible for cancellation of 
removal when the alien has been convicted of an “aggravated felony”; (2) 
the definitions section of the same title defines “aggravated felony” as in-
cluding “a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 
18)”;52 (3) 18 U.S.C. 924(c) defines “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony 
punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.)”; 
and (4) relevant for Carachuri-Rosendo, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) gives a federal 
court the option to sentence recidivist simple possession as a felony. 
The government, relying on this stacking of statutes, argued that 
Carachuri-Rosendo’s second simple-possession offense could have hypo-
thetically been punishable in federal court as an aggravated felony and that 
this possibility made his two misdemeanor convictions in state court dis-
qualifying events.53 
The Court, in language critical of both the government’s manipulations 
and the layers of poor definitions that allowed it, rejected the hypothetical 
felony approach and its application to Carachuri-Rosendo.54 The Court at-
tempted to cut through the ill-fitting definitions and the interpretive hypo-
thetical approach by adopting instead the “commonsense conception” of 
“aggravated felony.”55 The Court recognized that “a reading of this statutory 
scheme that would apply an ‘aggravated’ or ‘trafficking’ label to any simple 
possession offense is, to say the least, counterintuitive and ‘unorthodox.’”56 
Notably, the Court also recognized a benefit of the borrowed meaning: 
“[T]hat ambiguities in criminal statutes, where referenced in immigration 
law, are construed in favor of the noncitizen.”57 
 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2014). 
 53. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 573. 
 54. Id. at 575–77. 
 55. Id. at 573–74. 
 56. Id. at 574. The court rejected the government’s arguments for reasons other than the 
plain meaning of the text: The government’s approach failed to give full effect to the manda-
tory notice and process requirements of the federal recidivism statute; the hypothetical ap-
proach thwarts prosecutorial discretion and dispenses with procedural safeguards that are 
fundamental to federal drug laws; the Third Circuit misread Lopez by failing to use a categor-
ical approach that focused on the conduct that was actually punished, rather than the punish-
ment that could have been imposed; and the common practice in federal courts was incon-
sistent with the government’s position, in that this type of offense would almost never, if 
ever, be prosecuted as a felony in a federal court. Id.; see also Joy Sanders, U.S. Supreme 
Court Rules Noncitizens with Two or More Misdemeanor Possession Convictions Are Not 
Automatic Aggravated Felons, HOUS. LAW., July–Aug. 2010, at 47, 48. 
 57. Sanders, supra note 56, at 42 (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)); 
see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685 (2012) (addressing this issue and outlin-
ing two conditions that a state offense must meet in order to constitute a drug trafficking 
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3. Circuit Split #3: Whether “Drug Trafficking Crime” Can Mean 
Something Different in the INA and in the Sentencing Guidelines 
The third circuit split involves the same core factual question decided 
in Lopez—whether a state felony conviction may be treated as an aggravated 
felony by the government—but this split arises from a fourth layer of incor-
poration. Sentencing Guidelines for unlawfully entering or remaining in the 
United States increase the base level by eight levels when the defendant has 
previously been deported from or unlawfully remained in the United States 
after being convicted of an “aggravated felony.”58 Application Note 1 to 
section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) defines “aggravated felony” through an incorporated 
reference, giving it “the meaning given that term in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43),” 
which is the definitions section of the INA that in turn borrows a definition 
from the federal criminal code.59 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly extended Lopez to the 
Sentencing Guidelines and held that a state offense constitutes an aggravat-
ed felony for purposes of an enhancement “only if it proscribes conduct 
punishable as a felony under that federal law,”60 the language and reasoning 
of the Lopez holding make clear the Court intended it to apply to both the 
INA and the Sentencing Guidelines.61 
The Court indicated in Lopez its intent to broadly cover the area, but 
there lingers the fundamental question whether the linked term “drug traf-
ficking crime” could mean one thing when the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) cancellation of removal statute borrows it, and another 
when the Sentencing Guidelines borrow it. The competing theories on this 
question are typical of the dilemma courts face when interpreting the mean-
ing of incorporated definitions. On one side, courts recognize that incorpo-
rated definitions indicate the overarching congressional intent that supports 
reconciling the intra- and inter-circuit split between the hypothetical felony 
approach and the guidelines approach, and that defendants with similar 
 
crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B): First, “[i]t must ‘necessarily’ proscribe conduct that 
is an offense under the CSA; and [second,] the CSA must ‘necessarily’ prescribe felony pun-
ishment for that conduct”). 
 58. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) 
(2014) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
 59. Id. cmt. 1. 
 60. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006). 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa-Ocampo, 494 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“Given the Supreme Court’s discussion of the shared definition of ‘aggravated felony’ under 
the INA and the Sentencing Guidelines, the Court’s reference to [sentencing guidelines cas-
es], and the Court’s interpretation of the INA term ‘aggravated felony’ adopted by the Guide-
lines, it is beyond dispute that Lopez applies in both criminal sentencing and immigration 
matters.”). 
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backgrounds who commit the same offense should be treated similarly.62 On 
the other side, courts engage in a familiar, purpose-driven analysis of con-
gressional intent. Prior to the recent Court rulings, many circuits held that 
these borrowed, linked definitions could have different meanings in separate 
contexts because (1) the two statutory schemes had different purposes, and 
(2) the need for uniformity was greater in INS enforcement than it was in 
sentencing because states retain primary authority for sentencing.63 
This latter approach is appealing because it is consistent with the 
courts’ general approach to interpreting language of one statute by looking 
at similar or identical language in another statute.64 But because an incorpo-
rated reference appears to directly align the meaning of one section with the 
meaning of another, it may be absurd to imagine a member of the public will 
anticipate that behavior may qualify as an aggravated felony under one sec-
tion but not under another. 
Indeed, when federal courts have split on so many issues raised by the-
se poorly incorporated definitions, how could any of us governed by this 
maze have anticipated the scope of the incorporated definition in each con-
text? The incorporated definitions here are ineffective because they fail to 
provide any shared mental space between the drafters, the courts, and those 
impacted by the statutes. And the complexity most directly impacts vulnera-
ble defendants. 
4. United States v. Kramer: An Incorporated Definition That Reveals 
Weaknesses in the Original Definition 
Placing a definition in a new legal landscape through an incorporated 
reference strips the definition down to its plain language and may reveal 
weaknesses in the definition not as apparent in the larger context of the orig-
inal act. The Sentencing Guidelines’ incorporated definition of “computer” 
in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) provides just such an illus-
tration. 
On March 13, 2013, Professor Orin Kerr testified before the United 
States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Home-
land Security and Investigations on the dangers of the “remarkably vague” 
language in the CFAA.65 In his written remarks, Professor Kerr specifically 
 
 62. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 254 (2005). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Coello, 474 F. Supp. 2d 853, 863 n.11 (S.D. Tex. 
2007) (noting that it “goes without saying” that the Controlled Substances Act and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines serve different purposes, and, as such, one should expect certain differ-
ences) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 324)). 
 64. See discussion infra notes 12327 and accompanying text. 
 65. Orin S. Kerr, Investigating and Prosecuting 21st Century Cyber Threats: Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations (March 
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criticized the breadth of the CFAA’s definition of computer, contained in 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), which defines a “computer” as 
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed da-
ta processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, 
and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly 
related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term 
does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand 
held calculator, or other similar device.
66
 
As support for his criticism that the definition includes devices most 
people would not consider a computer—such as toys, coffeemakers, and 
calculators—Professor Kerr cited United States v. Kramer, an Eighth Circuit 
decision that did not even involve the CFAA but instead through an incorpo-
rated reference applied the CFAA’s definition of computer to an issue of 
sentencing enhancement.67 
The narrow question in Kramer was whether a basic cell phone the de-
fendant admitted using in the commission of the crime was a “computer” for 
purposes of Sentencing Guidelines section 2G1.3(b)(3).68 As is typical of the 
Guidelines, all but one of the terms defined in section 2G1.3(b)(3) are de-
fined with an incorporated reference.69 Comment 1 to the Guidelines states 
that “computer” is to have the meaning given it in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) of 
the CFAA, quoted above.70 
Kramer argued that because his cell phone could not access the inter-
net, it should not be considered a computer; it was more like the typewriter 
and the calculator—devices that were exempted from the definition.71 But 
the Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded that the plain reading of the borrowed 
definition restricted a computer to a device that accessed the internet. The 
court acknowledged that the definition from 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) is “ex-
ceedingly broad.”72 But because the Guidelines borrowed this broad defini-
tion, and because the cell phone at issue performed logical, arithmetic, and 
 
13, 2013, 11:30 AM), http://www.loc.gov/law/opportunities/PDFs/KerrCFAATestimony2013
.pdf. 
 66. United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2G1.3(b)(3) (defining “commercial sex act,” “com-
puter,” “illicit sexual conduct,” “interactive computer service,” “participant,” “prohibited 
sexual conduct,” “sexual act,” and “sexual contact” all through references to the U.S.C. or to 
other Guidelines). 
 70. Id. § 2G1.3(b)(3) cmt. n. 1. 
 71. Kramer, 631 F.3d at 902–05. 
 72. Id. at 902–03 (citing and quoting Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1577 (2010)). 
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storage functions, the court held it was a computer for purposes of the statu-
tory enhancement.73 
While the court held it was bound “by the specific—if broad—
definition set forth in § 1030(e)(1),” it acknowledged that the basic cell 
phone “might not easily fit within the colloquial definition of ‘computer.’”74 
In addition, the court seemed unconvinced that the meaning was intended by 
either the Sentencing Commission or Congress and warned that the broad, 
borrowed definition of § 1030(e)(1) “may come to capture still additional 
devices that few industry experts, much less the Commission or Congress, 
could foresee.”75 
Professor Kerr and other scholars have complained that the definition 
of computer is broad even in the context of the CFAA.76 These scholars rec-
ognize and debate the appropriateness of courts’ narrow interpretation of the 
CFAA definitions to control its application. But outside the CFAA interpre-
tative case law, the Eighth Circuit applied the plain language of the defini-
tion as incorporated and did not use the definition’s new context as either a 
reason for a narrow interpretation or even a distinct meaning from its origi-
nal placement in the CFAA. The court applied the text’s plain meaning and 
held that “to the extent that such a sweeping definition was unintended or is 
now inappropriate, it is a matter for the Commission or Congress to cor-
rect.”77 
In Kramer, the Eighth Circuit limited its interpretative role and thereby 
explicitly invited lawmakers to improve its broad definition, whose weak-
nesses are even more apparent outside the interpretative framework of the 
CFAA. In this way, the court was opening dialogue with lawmakers and 
encouraging a shared understanding of the incorporated reference, some-
thing courts do not do when they manipulate interpretative rules to reach a 
desired conclusion. 
 
 73. Id. at 903. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 903–04. 
 76. Kerr, supra note 65, at 3–4; Kelsey T. Patterson, Narrowing It Down to One Narrow 
View: Clarifying and Limiting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 
489, 497 (2013) (“Currently, a wide circuit split exists regarding the CFAA, specifically 
concerning the meaning of the terms without authorization and exceeds authorized access 
found within the statute.”); Samantha Jensen, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: 
Why Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 84 (2013) (“Only a 
narrow interpretation of the CFAA keeps the statute constitutional and fulfills Congress’s 
original and primary intent to punish criminal computer hackers and people who abuse legit-
imate access privileges.”). 
 77. Kramer, 631 F.3d at 903. 
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IV. BUILDING A SUPERIOR SYSTEM OF DEFINITION INCORPORATION AND 
INTERPRETATION 
These modern examples demonstrate the continued problem with defi-
nitions that are created with a drafting shortcut that, apparently, also repre-
sents a deliberation shortcut. But even with definitions that fit their new 
context, courts routinely have to answer questions raised by incorporated 
references. The first question deals with identifying the actual language that 
is borrowed—which should be a strictly legislative task. If not clear from 
the language of the link, courts must determine whether lawmakers intended 
that the incorporation be static, with the language remaining the language at 
the time of incorporation even if the original definition is amended or elimi-
nated, or whether lawmakers intended the incorporation to be dynamic, with 
the incorporated definition altering as the original alters. Lawmakers create 
this ambiguity when they fail to clearly indicate their intent, and courts have 
created and will continue to attempt to apply an unsatisfactory, unpredicta-
ble solution. The solution to confusion about the actual language of the bor-
rowed definition lies with the drafters. 
The second issue raised with an incorporated reference is whether the 
courts deciding the meaning of the language in the new context may be in-
formed by the meaning of the language in the original context or whether 
the linked definitions—even though they have identical language—may 
have different meanings. Determining the meaning of statutory language is 
not outside the courts’ role or expertise. Too often, however, the canons 
applied to incorporated references are used without evidence of judicial de-
liberation that would act to inform and forewarn the public and lawmakers. 
The solution to the inconsistent, unreasoned application of the canons there-
fore lies primarily with the courts. 
A. The Wrong Place for Judicial Interpretation: Determining the Actual 
Language of the Incorporated Definition 
When a statute defines a term through an incorporated reference, the 
first questions that should be asked—but are frequently not even raised by 
litigants or courts—are whether the original, borrowed language has 
changed since the incorporation and whether the adopting statute’s language 
changed with it. To determine whether an incorporation is static or dynamic, 
courts have developed two interpretive rules—the English rule and the 
American rule—but neither offers adequate certainty to litigants. 
378 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
1. The Logical but Unexpected Application of the English Rule to 
Subsequent Amendments 
The original common law of English and then American courts valued 
the “logic” and “certainty” behind a clear rule: the incorporation cloned the 
language that existed at the time of incorporation, and it is as if that lan-
guage itself appears in the borrowing statute.78
 
The two statutes “coexist as 
separate distinct legislative enactments, each having its appointed spheres of 
action.”79 In 1938, the Supreme Court held in Hassett v. Welch that a “spe-
cific and descriptive reference” to the adopted statute “takes the statute as it 
exists at the time of adoption and does not include subsequent additions or 
modifications by the statute so taken unless it does so by express intent.”80 
Courts recognized that the original language—and not the later amended 
language—was the definition considered and adopted by the drafters, and it 
should remain.81 Beyond this, courts adopted a clear law for the legitimate 
reason that “no other rule would furnish any certainty as to what was the 
law.”82 
But the certainty and logic of the English rule does not always match 
the expectations of the public, in part because this issue—as critical as it 
may be—is rarely raised in litigation. Most members of the public, most 
attorneys, and even most courts assume the reference to another section’s 
definition is a reference to that section’s current language, not to language 
that existed at the time of incorporation and may no longer be easily discov-
erable. So this issue is raised inconsistently, in odd cases. Moreover, some 
 
 78. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 625 (1838) (recognizing that incorpora-
tion has always been considered as adopting the law existing at the time of the adoption, and 
that “[n]o other rule would furnish any certainty as to what was the law”); Read, supra note 
3, at 271. 
 79. 1A SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 22:25. Accordingly, “[a]s neither statute de-
pends upon the other’s enactment for its existence, the repeal of the provision in one enact-
ment does not affect its operation in the other statute.” Id. 
 80. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938) (“Where one statute adopts the 
particular provisions of another by a specific and descriptive reference to the statute or provi-
sions adopted, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been 
incorporated bodily into the adopting statute. Such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the 
time of adoption and does not include subsequent additions or modifications by the statute so 
taken unless it does so by express intent.” (quoting 2 JABEZ GRIDLEY SUTHERLAND & JOHN 
LEWIS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, INCLUDING A DISCUSSION OF LEGISLATIVE 
POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE FORMS OF LEGISLATION AND TO 
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 787 (2d ed. 1904))). 
 81. See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
103, 104–05 (2008) (noting that when the adoption is of a foreign law, a dynamic adoption 
delegates lawmaking authority and is therefore controversial). 
 82. Read, supra note 3, at 270 (citing Kendal v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 
625 (1838)). 
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courts will not even rely on the English rule adopted in Hassett unless they 
find a facial defect with the cross reference or target statute being interpret-
ed.83 
The English rule gets everyone’s attention, however, when it is strictly 
applied to bring an otherwise defunct definition back when the incorporated 
reference points “out to the ether.”84 For example, in United States v. Rob-
erts, the Second Circuit held that the sentencing court could apply Sentenc-
ing Guidelines section 2K2.1(a)(5), which allows for an increased sentence 
if the offense involves a firearm described in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30), even 
though § 921(a)(30) had been repealed by the time the defendant was sen-
tenced.85 The court saw “no sensible alternative” to reading the reference to 
§ 921(a)(30) “to mean that despite the repeal of that statute, courts should 
continue to ascertain whether the firearm used by the defendant in the com-
mission of the crime qualified as a ‘semiautomatic assault weapon’ under 
that section.”86 In Artistic Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, the 
Eleventh Circuit applied definitions incorporated by reference from an ordi-
nance that was declared unconstitutional for reasons having nothing to do 
with the definitions.87 “For incorporation purposes, as long as the referenced 
definition is certain and is readily available, it is valid: that the ordinance 
referenced has lapsed or has been repealed or has been invalidated (for rea-
sons unrelated to the definition) is not important.”88 Under the English rule, 
the elimination of a provision in one enactment does not affect its operation 
in the borrowing statute.89 
Because the English rule is only raised and relied upon when an incor-
porated reference link appears broken on its face, its strict application and 
unanticipated results confuse litigants and cause courts some discomfort. In 
 
 83. See United States v. Head, 552 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Oates, 
427 F.3d 1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 2005); Krolick Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 558 
F.2d 685, 686–88 (3d Cir. 1977); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. E. Coal Corp., 
561 F.2d 632, 635–41 (6th Cir. 1977); Dir., Office of Workmens’ Comp. Program, U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor v. Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 560 F.2d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Carriers Con-
tainer Council, Inc. v. Mobile S.S. Ass’n, 948 F.2d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 1991) (relying in 
part on Hassett to reject a claim that a provision governing interest implicitly incorporated a 
provision governing compounding of interest); United States v. Smith, 683 F.2d 1236, 1238 
n.8, 1247 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (noting that “the Youth Corrections Act does not mesh 
nicely with the Probation Act” before concluding that a cross-reference from the former 
statute to the latter was a general reference (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 84. Head, 552 F.3d at 646 (noting references to repealed statutory provisions). 
 85. 442 F.3d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Myers, 553 F.3d 328, 
333 (4th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that courts uniformly hold § 921(a)(30)(B) is properly treat-
ed as remaining in force for sentencing purposes). 
 86. Roberts, 442 F.3d at 130. 
 87. 331 F.3d 1196, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 88. Id. (citing In re Heath, 144 U.S. 92 (1892)). 
 89. 1A SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 22:25. 
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Fisher v. City of Grand Island, Justice Shanahan of the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska labeled the English rule the “Lazarus rule,” as it brought back 
through an incorporated reference a procedure that had been eliminated.90 
Justice Shanahan complained that the revival of amended procedure be-
trayed the “experience and ordinary expectations” of the practitioner and 
that it failed to give individuals adequate notice of the law.91 
2. The American Rule as a Rule to Divine Legislative Intent 
Early American courts struggled against the strictures of the English 
rule as adopted in Hassett and developed an exception to recognize that 
lawmakers may sometimes intend that the incorporated reference include 
subsequent amendments. Courts subsequently read Hassett narrowly to ap-
ply to only a “specific and descriptive reference” and distinguished specific 
references from general references that refer to the law on a subject more 
broadly.92 While specific references exclude subsequent amendments, a gen-
eral reference indicates the drafters’ intent that the two sections develop 
together.93 A general reference refers to the law on a subject generally and 
indicates the drafters’ intent that the two sections develop together. General 
references therefore include subsequent amendments.94 
From the beginning, because the American rule allowed for this excep-
tion, it failed to provide the certainty of the English rule and failed to facili-
 
 90. 479 N.W.2d 772, 774–78 (Neb. 1992) (Shanahan, J., dissenting); Jeanelle R. Rob-
son, “Lazarus Come Forth. And He That Was Dead Came Forth.” An Examination of the 
Lazarus Rule: Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 221, 221–22 (1992) 
(arguing the Nebraska Supreme Court erroneously failed to consider legislative intent and the 
general versus specific reference analytical framework that other courts have applied). 
 91. Fisher, 479 N.W.2d at 778. No court, however, has held that an incorporated refer-
ence was so confusing that it failed to satisfy due process. See Colautti v. Granklin, 439 U.S. 
379, 390 (1979) (holding a criminal statute void for vagueness only when it “fails to give a 
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the 
statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions”). 
 92. See, e.g., Clark v. Crown Const. Co., 887 F.2d 149, 152 (8th Cir. 1989) (“In other 
words, the 1969 Act’s reference to the Longshoremen’s Act was a ‘general’ rather than a 
‘specific’ reference. It envisaged a systematic structure rather than an isolated statutory frag-
ment, a forest rather than a single tree, a tree rather than a single leaf.”); Dir., Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Peabody Coal Co., 554 F.2d 310, 329 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (“On balance, we are persuaded toward the view that § 422(a) of the amended 
(May 1972) FCMHSA, 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (Supp. V, 1975), is a general reference masquer-
ading as a specific and descriptive reference.”). 
 93. 2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 51:7 (noting that specific references “incorpo-
rate provisions as they exist at the time of adoption, without subsequent amendments, unless 
a legislature has expressly or by strong implication shown its intention to incorporate subse-
quent amendments with the statute”). 
 94. Id. 
2015] PROBLEMS WITH INCORPORATED DEFINITIONS 381 
tate a shared understanding between drafters, courts, and the public.95 First, 
the rule relied upon an unstable foundation: the distinction between specific 
and general references is slight and imprecise, and courts were parsing a 
drafting tool intended only to aid in efficiency.96 Lawmakers are not likely 
to carefully consider the language of incorporation and the consequences of 
subsequent amendments when the incorporated reference tool itself allows 
lawmakers not to carefully consider the definition. 
Second, the distinction between general and specific references is un-
likely to get drafters’ attention unless courts clearly and predictably adhere 
to its strict application. In practice, however, courts regularly categorize 
references as general or specific based not on the language of the reference, 
but on the court’s interpretation of legislative intent. Courts routinely assert 
that facially specific legislative references are general references.97 In prac-
tice, courts interpret most references as general; the distinction does little 
more than provide courts with a “generous flexibility.”98 Contrary to the 
predictable English rule, courts are free to presume that lawmakers intend 
the linked definitions to develop together, even when the reference is facial-
ly specific.99 
For example, a facially specific reference may be construed as a gen-
eral reference because of its larger context. In United States v. Rodriguez-
Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit held that, although 46 U.S.C. § 1903 by its 
terms reads as a specific reference to 21 U.S.C. § 960, because titles 46 and 
21 “are both part of a larger legislative scheme aimed at increasing the pen-
alties for those violating the federal narcotics law,” the reference is general 
and includes all subsequent amendments to the cited statute.100 In EEOC v. 
Chrysler Corp., the district court found that the “surface specificity of the 
incorporating language dissolved upon close judicial scrutiny” when “the 
complex interplay of two statutory schemes, one of which is incorporated 
 
 95. Boyd, supra note 27, at 1240 (noting that this presumption was intended to bring 
certainty to the law, but it “was destined to foster only more confusion”); see also Read, 
supra note 3, at 276. 
 96. Boyd, supra note 27, at 1240. 
 97. See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co., 554 F.2d at 323; see also Boyd, supra note 27, at 
1242–43 (giving multiple state court examples of conflicting holdings; “examples abound”); 
2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 51:7 (“Facially specific references can, and sometimes 
do, operate as general legislative references.”). 
 98. Boyd, supra note 27, at 1243 (commenting on the Florida corollary interpretive 
rule). 
 99. Read, supra note 3, at 276 (“Perhaps the apparent contradictions between the cases 
which purport to apply the [specific/general distinction] are reconcilable on the basis of a 
silent application of an all pervading doctrine of statutory construction: that a court may 
transmute any so-called rule of construction into a mere canon to be discarded in the face of 
the court’s notion of what was or should have been the instant ‘legislative intent.’”). 
 100. 863 F.2d 803, 831 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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into the other, warrants the conclusion that this facially specific reference 
actually operates as a general one.”101 
In an even broader blurring of the distinction, courts have characterized 
a link as general, not on the language of the incorporation, but because the 
court finds the subject matter of the statute itself to be “general.”102 Scholars 
have criticized not only the unpredictability in the general/specific classifi-
cations, but also the lack of careful reasoning behind the classifications: 
“[R]easoned judicial applications of the distinction have been rarer than 
radium.”103 
Finally, the American rule fails because it allows the court discretion in 
an area where judicial discretion is inappropriate. Determining the actual 
language of the definitions—and not just the meaning of the terms of the 
definition—is a legislative task, and it should not be left to the musings and 
manipulations of the courts. Without a predictable framework for determin-
ing the actual language of an incorporated definition, even careful attor-
neys—not to mention members of the public—are left with a series of ques-
tions to answer just to get to a definition to interpret.104 
As demonstrated by the history of the English rule and the American 
rule, courts have been unable to craft and then strictly apply a rule that can 
justify its holdings on the applicability of subsequent amendments to the 
incorporating definition. Because courts have failed to narrowly apply the 
general/specific distinction, lawmakers are not on notice that the distinction 
is relevant, and litigants are left with a “bewildering enterprise of statutory 
interpretation.”105 
 
 101. 546 F. Supp. 54, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff’d, 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 102. Read, supra note 3, at 271 n.9. 
 103. Id. at 273 (noting his primary criticism is that “most of the courts forced to confront 
the problem have been content merely to enunciate the general approaches as though they 
were dogmatic rules and that reasoned judicial analysis has been almost absent from the 
opinions”); see also R. Perry Sentell, Reference Statutes, Borrow Now and Pay Later?, 10 
GA. L. REV. 153 (1975). 
 104. Scott A. Baxter, Reference Statutes: Traps for the Unwary, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
562, 568 (1999) (listing the questions a researcher faces with an incorporated reference, in-
cluding whether one should research prior versions of a definition and whether one should 
engage in an elaborate legislative intent analysis just to convince the court of the applicable 
law). 
 105. John L. Flynn, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy 
Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2009, 2065 (recommending a narrow reading of 
the “linked statutes rule” because a broad linking of statutes intrudes on later Congress’s 
prerogatives to shape meaning, creates too difficult an interpretive task for courts, and is a 
rule with balanced burdens). 
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3. The Solution 
There is no satisfactory substitute for drafters making clear whether 
language is incorporated only in its present form or includes subsequent 
amendments. A failure to do so not only leaves the question open to the un-
certainties of interpretation, but also may jeopardize the constitutionality of 
the incorporating provision.106 If incorporation includes future changes, it 
may be construed as an unconstitutional delegation of “the legislative power 
to the persons authorized to change the incorporated material.”107 
Although drafters have been encouraged to be precise with incorpo-
rated references since 1941,108 the effort now—thanks to technological ad-
vances—need not burden the efficiency of the shortcut and should become a 
routine process for incorporating a definition through reference. When in-
serting the incorporated reference, drafters may choose just to refer to the 
statutory section, indicating that they intend the two statutes to develop to-
gether, or drafters may hyperlink to the exact copy of the original material 
and make that link permanent, if drafters do not intend that the language 
amend with the original.109 With this small, practical step, lawmakers would 
reclaim the decision on what language is incorporated, thus eliminating a 
significant area of uncertainty in incorporated definitions. 
B. The Right Place for Judicial Interpretation: Determining the Meaning 
of the Incorporated Language 
The Hassett rule was narrowly adopted to address whether future 
amendments to the first statute impacted the borrowed language in the se-
cond; as stated above, the Court held that at incorporation the two linked 
statutes have identical but independent language.110 Courts have extended 
the Hassett rule to decide not only the language that is borrowed, but also 
the meaning of that language—specifically, whether a definition may have 
an independent meaning in its new context, distinct from its meaning in its 
original context. 
The Hassett rule is not irrelevant to this inquiry, but too often courts 
use it as a stand-in for careful, thoughtful deliberation that should be the 
 
 106. See DICKERSON, supra note 6, at 131; Flynn, supra note 105, at 2065. 
 107. DICKERSON, supra note 6, at 132. Dickerson further recommends spelling out the 
language rather than including it through a reference to avoid the risk of the incorporation 
being “functionally orphaned by later changes in the incorporated law.” Id. 
 108. Read, supra note 3, at 276 (“[T]he wise draftsmen will avoid the rule . . . by explicit-
ly stating whether or not the reference is confined to the then existing precept or is to include 
any future change or substitution.”). 
 109. See Boyd, supra note 27, at 1249–50 (giving that same advice to Florida lawmak-
ers). 
 110. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938). 
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hallmark of judicial interpretation. Struggling with the complexities of 
meaning and making them consistent with the purpose of legislation is a 
critical judicial role, especially in an area with complex statutory references. 
Interpretive gaps in meaning need not be mystifying to, or glossed over for, 
the litigants; they should, in fact, invite thoughtful argument by both sides 
on the language of the definition and the values that may justify an interpre-
tation, resulting in a judicial opinion that answers issues raised and informs 
later issues.111 
1. Unexpected Results When Hassett Is Applied Without Judicial 
Analysis 
When courts cite Hassett (or apply it without a reference) and simply 
assert that two linked definitions are independent and need not have the 
same meaning, without reference to broader legislative purposes, litigants 
may be surprised that goods or conduct may be included under the definition 
in one section, but not under another section. 
In United States v. Ray, the Eighth Circuit affirmed Ray’s sentence en-
hancement, holding that guns found at Ray’s home qualified as “firearms” 
under Sentencing Guidelines section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), which incorporated by 
reference the definition of “firearms” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30) of the as-
sault-weapons ban.112 But Ray owned these guns legally under the assault-
weapons ban itself because they had been grandfathered in under § 
922(v)(2).113 Ray, therefore, had his sentence enhanced even though the def-
inition incorporated into the Sentencing Guidelines came from an act that 
did not itself make the weapons illegal.114 The majority of the courts holding 
on this issue agree that the scope of an incorporated definition may be 
broader than the same definition in its original context, although at least one 
court acknowledged it could not fault an attorney for failing to adequately 
argue the issue because “the need to research the effect of a grandfather pro-
vision found in another statute . . . would not have been obvious.”115 
 
 111. SOLAN, supra note 22, at 3. 
 112. 411 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 113. Id. at 905 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(2) (2000)). 
 114. Id. Most circuits have held similarly that the clause grandfathering weapons applies 
to defendants charged with simple possession but not to sentence enhancements under the 
guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 485 F.3d 951, 954 (7th Cir. 2007). But see 
United States v. O’Malley, 332 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the govern-
ment conceded the weapons were not illegal under the assault-weapons ban and were there-
fore not grounds for enhancement). 
 115. Counterman v. United States, No. 2:08-CV-142, 2009 WL 3585942, at *3 (W.D. 
Mich. Oct. 27, 2009) (refusing to find a defendant’s trial counsel constitutionally deficient for 
failing to raise an argument on this issue). 
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The rules on incorporated references may also be manipulated to an-
swer creative but odd arguments. While the courts may reach an expected 
outcome in these cases, their strict application of the interpretive rules—
without reference to a statute’s larger policy or purpose—just exacerbates 
the impression that these rules are manipulated. In United States v. Oates, 
the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that a court must liter-
ally apply Sentencing Guidelines even though they incorporate a section 
with the wrong definition.116 The court called on the English rule and held 
that because at the time the 2003 guidelines were adopted they referenced 
the correct section, the existing statute thereby “preserved the original defi-
nition notwithstanding the failure to correctly cross-reference the statute 
after its reorganization.”117 
The interpretative rules may also be ignored when it suits a court’s 
purposes. In United States v. Syverson, the Seventh Circuit held—without 
citation or justification—that an incorporated definition did not get its mean-
ing from the new, adopting context, but that it “borrows the meaning” of the 
original context.118 The defendant had argued that because the incorporated 
definition included the phrase “designed and intended” to be converted into 
a machine gun, prosecutors needed to prove that he “intended” to put the 
parts together as a machine gun, not just that they were “designed” for that 
purpose.119 The court rejected Syverson’s textual argument with a discussion 
of the historic development of the phrase in the original statute, and it as-
serted that the meaning of the phrase in the new statute could not mean more 
than it meant in the borrowed, original statute.120 
These courts may have reached expected outcomes in these cases, but 
their manipulation of the rules of incorporated references frustrates the rea-
son and predictability that should counter the maze of links created by statu-
tory references. 
 
 116. 427 F.3d 1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 117. Id. For a similar holding, but from a carefully reasoned opinion, see Herrmann v. 
Cencom Cable Associates, Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit in 
Hermann recognizes that because of the complexity of modern statutes that frequently 
amend, 
[e]very new section or sentence in a text riddled with cross-references poses a 
risk that one of the references will point to thin air, or to a destination out of 
synch with the referring provision. Political, judicial, and private actors alike 
need a simple, reliable way to unravel these mistakes. The best approach, we be-
lieve, is the one we have used here: treat the referring clause as continuing to 
point to its original target, even if that target moves or acquires a new number. 
Id. (recognizing that the holding “follows the logic behind the principle that new section 
numbers or minor changes in phraseology during the recodification of a title of the United 
States Code do not alter its meaning”). 
 118. 90 F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 119. Id. at 229–31. 
 120. Id. 
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2. The Solution 
When the issue before a court is the meaning of an incorporated defini-
tion, the thin assertions, manipulations, and misstatements of the Hassett 
rule interfere with the natural placement of this analysis within the spectrum 
of established rules for using language in one statute to inform the meaning 
of language in another section. Courts have been doing this kind of compar-
ative interpretation for a long time and have established consistent, predicta-
ble analyses on the spectrum of related meaning. 
The difference between definitions that are closely enough related to be 
linked in meaning and those that are not is only one of degree, and the 
touchstone is congressional intent that the two meanings be similar.121 At the 
far end of the spectrum, when legislation uses commonplace words, courts 
generally will not look to other sections for guidance but will construe the 
terms to provide adequate notice to the public and direction to the courts.122 
When two sections use similar—but not identical—phrases, courts are reluc-
tant to adopt the definition of another section unless specifically directed to 
do so; use of a similar phrase alone is not enough to indicate Congress in-
tended the same meaning.123 But—moving along the spectrum—when two 
sections use the same phrases, courts will give identical terms identical 
meanings if they find the provisions are topically related.124 In this last cate-
 
 121. See, e.g., 2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 53:2 (“This difference in degree is 
rationalized and explained by the specificity or generality which characterizes the relation-
ship between particular statutes.”). 
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432, 436 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the definition of “manslaughter” as used in Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1 
should be the same meaning given by the Model Penal Code because it is “the best generic, 
contemporary, and modern definition, particularly because it has been widely adopted”). 
 123. See, e.g., United States v. Reorganized, 518 U.S. 213, 219 (1996) (“Here and there 
in the Bankruptcy Code Congress has included specific directions that establish the signifi-
cance for bankruptcy law of a term used elsewhere in the federal statutes.”); In re Arclin U.S. 
Holding, Inc., 416 B.R. 117, 121 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (refusing to base the definition of 
“retiree benefits” on a definition borrowed from statutes designed without bankruptcy in 
mind); In re Walker, 2009 WL 3416056, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 8, 2009) (“A 
phrase does not retain its legal definition when applied in a wholly different context.”). 
 124. See Cheryl L. Anderson, Unification of Standards in Discrimination Law: The Co-
nundrum of Causation and Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, 82 MISS. L.J. 67, 
93–97 (2013) (describing the shared “because of” causation language in federal discrimina-
tion statutes and whether those statutes should also share the interpretative case law); 2B 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 51:3 (noting the “guiding principle” to be “that if it is natu-
ral and reasonable to think that the understanding of legislators or persons affected by a stat-
ute is influenced by another statute, then a court construing such an act also should allow its 
understanding to be similarly influenced”); United States v. Damon, 595 F.3d 395, 400 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (“[S]imilar language used in different sources of law may be interpreted different-
ly.”). 
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gory, courts look to the “interpretive relevance” of the two statutes for a 
shared purpose and function.125 
An incorporated reference fits at the end of this spectrum of presumed 
shared meaning: the language is identical, and the lawmakers have linked 
the two provisions in the text of the second statute.126 Courts, then, may pre-
sume—unless there is evidence of contrary congressional intent—that the 
definitions should share the same meaning and that the decisions interpret-
ing the borrowed section may inform the meaning of the borrowing sec-
tion.127 The Eastern District of Virginia inferred just this from an incorpo-
rated reference, finding support for its interpretation of the meaning of “traf-
fic” in § 2318(b)(2) because it was consistent with the meaning of the term 
in the borrowed statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2320: “Congress’s decision to borrow § 
2320’s definition of ‘traffic’ in § 2318 suggests that Congress viewed the 
statutes—and their knowledge requirements—similarly.”128 The D.C. Circuit 
has also explicitly held that the presumption that identical terms have identi-
cal meanings in related provisions is particularly true when one statute bor-
rows a term from another.129 
This presumption of shared meaning is overcome when the courts de-
termine that the purposes of the sections are distinct. For example, in a case 
with shared language, the Third Circuit determined that the meanings of 
“claim” and “creditor” as used in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) could be informed by the meanings 
given those terms in the Bankruptcy Code and defining caselaw.130 But the 
court declined to apply the portion of the meaning in the bankruptcy context 
 
 125. See, e.g., Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 128–33 (1943) (comparing 
different statutory provisions using the phrase “engaged in commerce”); United States v. 
Minker, 217 F.2d 350, 351–53 (3d Cir. 1954), aff’d, 334 U.S. 179 (1965) (comparing the 
sanctions provided in the INA with those provided in criminal statutes); 2B SUTHERLAND, 
supra note 31, at § 53:3 (noting that “[c]ourts look to the function of statutes having similar 
language to determine the possibility of a [shared meaning]”). 
 126. Cf. United States v. Murillo, 2008 WL 697160, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 13, 2008) 
(refusing to borrow a definition of “identification document” for 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) from 18 
U.S.C. § 1028 because “there is no reference in § 1546 to § 1028”). 
 127. See Flynn, supra note 105, at 2037 (noting that the “Borrowed Statute Rule” “pre-
sumes that a legislature incorporates high court judicial interpretations of a statute it incorpo-
rates by reference or modeling”). 
 128. Microsoft Corp. v. Pronet Cyber Technologies, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 2d 876, 885 (E.D. 
Va. 2009) (noting “general rule that courts should interpret similar language in related stat-
utes alike” (citing Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1483 (4th Cir. 1996))); 
accord 2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 31, at § 53:3. 
 129. Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 130. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 386–88 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
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because it found that this portion of the meaning was “inconsistent with the 
general goals of Congress in passing FIRREA.”131 
The manipulations of the Hassett rule can confuse what should be a 
straightforward inquiry into whether two linked statutes have a shared pur-
pose. The First Circuit in Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., tasked with interpreting 
“impairment,” “major life activities,” and “substantially limits” as used in 
definition of “disability” in the FMLA, expressed its frustration with the 
Secretary of Labor for “co-opting” existing definitions through incorporated 
references to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).132 The court rec-
ognized that “[s]ome perplexing difficulties lurk in the shadows cast by this 
cross-reference, including questions about the extent to which the EEOC’s 
informal interpretations of the borrowed definitions are binding in the 
FMLA context.”133 
Despite the court’s frustration with the drafting of the statute, it fell 
back on traditional statutory analysis to determine whether to apply the 
EEOC’s interpretations of the borrowed definition in an FMLA applica-
tion.134 The court’s analysis is consistent with the spectrum described above; 
it starts with a presumption that the linked definitions share the same mean-
ing but then concludes that “the EEOC interpretive guidance cannot be ap-
plied to the FMLA because it clashes with the underlying purposes of the 
statute.”135 The court held that the two statutes “have divergent aims, operate 
in different ways, and offer disparate relief.”136 Consequently, drafters could 
not have intended that “disability” in the FMLA—even though it is created 
through incorporated references to the ADA—have the same meaning as 
“disability” in the ADA.137 
The court’s examination of the purposes of both sections not only ex-
tends the spectrum of shared meaning in a logical way, it allows the court a 
defined, appropriate space for thoughtful jurisprudence. The Third Circuit 
engaged in a similar purpose-driven analysis of the meaning of “disposal” in 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), which was defined through an incorporated reference to the 
“disposal” definition in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA).138 At issue was whether “disposal” included a passive migration of 
 
 131. Id. at 388. 
 132. 261 F.3d 90, 92–93 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 133. Id. at 92 (recognizing that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
drafted the ADA and is responsible for its interpretation). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 101. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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contaminants.139 The court examined the structure and language of the 
RCRA, but it held that the disparate structures of liability schemes in and 
purposes of both the acts justified disparate meanings for “disposal.”140 The 
court held, based upon the plain meaning of the borrowed words and the 
structure and purposes of CERCLA, that “disposal” required an affirmative 
act.141 
In short, the two techniques of repurposing definitions—borrowed lan-
guage and incorporated references—should encourage the same analysis in 
the courts.142 The end result of drafters’ use of either technique is the same: 
the language of one definition is repeated in the other and has an existence 
separate from the original statute.143 Therefore, courts should employ the 
same analytic framework when deciding the meaning of the borrowing defi-
nition. The terms mean the same, and lawmakers intended that interpretive 
law be used to inform the meaning, unless the purposes of the two sections 
are distinct and divergent or Congress shows an express intent otherwise. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As noted by Justice Antonin Scalia, “[w]e live in an age of legislation, 
and most new law is statutory law.”144 Much of that statutory law is riddled 
with definitions created for another purpose but borrowed without evidence 
that drafters considered how the definition would fit its new context or 
whether that definition should withstand subsequent amendments. 
In many cases, these ambiguities will be unnoticed and inconsequen-
tial; lawyers will not find or make arguments on the borrowed language, and 
courts will smooth over inconsistencies. But when the fit of an incorporated 
reference is poor enough, the consequences—often to those who are most 
vulnerable—are often unexpected and dramatic. 
These ambiguities also have a broader impact on the integrity of our 
governance. A poorly crafted incorporated reference will shift to the courts 
the discretion not only to interpret but also to set the statutory language. 
Courts have proven themselves poorly equipped to handle what is a legisla-
tive task. And definitions that fail to predictably communicate their lan-
guage, meaning, and scope to the public fail to give us the information we 
need to conform our behavior. 
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The shame in the continuing problems arising from the use of incorpo-
rated references is that the confusion is avoidable, and avoiding it does not 
take a level of effort that overly burdens the drafting shortcut. First, drafters 
must indicate, either through clear language or a hyperlink, whether the in-
corporation is intended to include subsequent amendments. The court’s in-
terpretive rule is broken, and odds are (without a contrary indication from 
drafters) that the link will be considered “general” and dynamic, even if the 
reference is specific on its face. Second, drafters should make clear whether 
they intend that the meaning of the original definition, as it has developed in 
interpretive decisions, should be given to the same language in its new con-
text. If drafters fail to do so, courts should engage in an analysis of the pur-
pose of the two linked sections, as is consistent with settled rules of interpre-
tation, and resist the urge to rely without justification on the odd interpretive 
rules of incorporated references. 
